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This study focuses on how to confine error recovery to 
the immediate environment of a failed computation (process) 
by restricting information flow through the system. A 
module called a manager that restricts the access of 
operations (procedures) to shared data representation is 
proposed. The use of descriptors to represent address 
variables (pointers) and procedure parameters is also 
proposed to restrict the amount of information available to 
a procedure. A linguistic mechanism to define recoverable 
data and inverse procedures (procedures that reverse the 
actions of another procedure) to undo completed actions is 
presented. A system data structure that defines a recovery 
environment to support system implemented recovery is 
presented. 
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With the increasing use of computers in very critical 
environments such as aircraft control, electronic fund 
transfer systems, and electronic switching systems a new and 
important attribute is being required of the software for 
these systems. This attribute is reli~bility. A reliable 
software is one that can detect and recover from most common 
errors. The current approach to software fault tolerance in 
those critical systems is by massive redundancy in code, 
data, and hardware components. General purpose systems 
cannot afford this level of redundancy because of 
prohibitive cost. In order to be able to develop reliable 
software, the operating system itself must be designed to be 
robust and also provide facilities for the development of 
fault tolerant software systems. 
A possible iterative approach for building fault 
. 
tolerant software is: 
1. design an algorithm that meets the specification of 
the software assuming an error-free execution environment; 
2. derive constraints for the correctness of the 
algorithms; 
3. add algorithms to check for the violation of the 
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constraints; 
4. specify action to be taken when a constraint 
violation is detected; and 
5. repeat steps 1-4 as necessary. 
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The algorithm developed in step one may contain some design 
flaws. Some of the flaws can be detected and corrected by 
applying a correctness proof on the algorithm or during 
system testing. It is also possible that after testing and 
application of correctness proof some design !laws still 
remain which show up in the production environment. Even 
when all errors and design flaws have been eliminated, a 
hardware failure can cause a failure of the software. The 
algorithm to implement step three constitute the error 
detection code. It may take the form of assertions, or the 
form of audits and processes that monitor the execution of 
other processes depending on the type of error being 
detected [22]. The algorithm for step four is the error 
recovery code. A recovery action makes the system oblivious 
of the error by either correcting the error, or repairing 
the cause of the error or by restoring the system to a 
previously known error-free state (checkpoint). A recovery 
action takes the system to a point where normal operation 
can continue. A software system that is developed by 
following steps 1-4 is called fault tolerant or reliable 
software. The code and data that are used to implement 
steps three and four constitute the redundancy in the 
software. The inclusion of redundancy increases the ·cost of 
developing and using the software. Development cost is 
increased from writing more code than is necessary. The 
usage cost is incurred by executing more code than is 
necessary in error-free ca~es. 
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Error recovery is pivotal for the reliable operation of 
a fault tolerant software. Error recovery involves changing 
the state of the data item(s) affected by an error to a 
state where reliable operation can proceed. To reduce the 
cost of error recovery the system state (system data) 
affected by an error should be made as small as possible. 
This can be achieved through robust system design. The 
design dimension include system decomposition technique and 
information exchange mechanisim between modules. The two 
dimensions taken together can create unforseen 
interrelationships between modules which can make successful 
error recovery increasingly difficult. A system 
decomposition method which reduces the objects accessible to 
a module and which employs explicit mechanism for 
intermodule interaction can reduce error recovery cost. 
Problem Statement 
An operating system is an important piece of software 
in a computer system. It is the administrator of the run-
time environment of a computer system. · The complexity of an 
operating system is such that it is very difficult to 
eliminate all errors during system testing. Errors 
undetected during system testing may manifest themselves in 
4 
production environment due to rare combination of 
circumstances, such as unanticipated resource usage pattern. 
Some errors due to timing are difficult to detect during 
testing because of the difficulty in making up the test data 
that can cause such errors. This implies that one cannot be 
absolutely confident that a complex software such as an 
operating system is error free. To provide reliable 
operation, extra code and information for error detection 
and recovery must be included in the design. 
Both error detection and recovery algorithms are 
redundant actions because they are not necessary in a 
fault-free system. During error recovery all interactions 
the faulty process participated in must be identified and 
undone to restore the system to a state where normal 
processing can continue. In a concurrent system the success 
of any eiror recovery effort hinges on the correct 
determination of the faulty environment. A faulty 
environment is the set of processes directly or indirectly 
affected by an error. The structural relationship of the 
processes, the form of interaction (information exchange), 
and the size of the faulty environment affects the cost of 
recovery. This study is focused on how to reduce the cost 
of recovery by restricting the information flow among 
processes. 
The temporal localization of error recovery in 
operating systems is focused on the restriction of 
information flow. It is concerned with the confinement of 
error recovery to the immediate environment of a failed 
process. An effective means to determine the immediate 
environment is required. The restriction of information 
flow can help define a damaged environment. It does not 
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involve a determination of the cause of an error in order to 
repair or correct the error. The restriction of information 
flow serves a dual purpose. The first is that it ensures 
that errors do not have wide coverage. The coverage of an 
error is the number of execution environments (processes) 
affected by an error. The second is that it can reduce the 
cost of error recovery. 
There are two aspects of information flow control 
addressed in the study. The first concerns a method for 
restricting the amount of information a procedure can 
access. The objective here is to contain the actions of a 
process within its immediate environment. 
The second aspect is concerned with how to detect and 
to recover from control errors for processes that retain 
their execution histories to ensure that future actions are 
consistent with their recent past. A control error is an 
incorrect scheduling decision. Processes that belong to 
this class include resource schedulers. A recovery action 
involves a repair or a restoration of the system to a 
previous consistent state to prevent further damage. Error 
repair involves identification of the cause of an error, 
determining its location, and then fixing it. The 
restoration of the system to a consistent state involves 
saving enough state information to reconstruct the system 
state. The study is concerned with the state restoration 
aspect of error recovery. 
The main contribution of this study are: 
1. a part of an operating system called a manager to 
allow the sharing of abstract objects, and 
2. the definition of a recovery context. 
The manager separates the protection domain of the shared 
object and the object operations (procedures) and also 
partitions the data space into shared data and control data 
with each data subspace being manipulated by specific 
program units within the manager. This helps to localize 
error recovery by restricting the source of an error to one 
subspace. The recovery context contains necessary 
information for the operating system to initiate error 
recovery on behalf of a failed process. The recovery 
context also serves the purpose of defining an immediate 
recovery environment. 
6 
The main thrust of this study has been defined. In the 
next chapter related work in operating system and software 
reliability is reviewed. The third chapter focuses on 
information control mechanisms. Chapter IV focuses on error 
detection with emphasis on control error and recovery 
mechanisms. A summary of the study and concluding remarks 
are presented in Chapter v. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The correct operation of a computer system depends on 
the proper functioning of the hardware components and the 
program modules comprising the operating system. Hardware 
components have employed correcting codes such as parity 
codes, Hamming code, and self-checking circuits to detect 
and correct errors in transmitted information [43]. Time-
outs are also employed to detect malfunctioning hardware 
devices. 
Residual design faults have been attributed to many 
errors in software systems [38]. Design faults are defects 
in the specification of a program and its implementation 
algorithms. They are present from the beginning and 
manifest their presence when executed with some input data 
values and some rare combination of dircumstances. Design 
faults in a hardware algorithm can also cause a software 
program to malfunction~ Endres [16] analysis of errors in 
IBM DOS/VS operating system revealed that interaction among 
processes and implementation of the design decisions are 
significant causes of errors. Some of these errors are due 
to incorrect process switching, incorrect resource 
allocation, necessary interrupts not responded to, etc. 
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Some implementation errors were attributed to failure to 
initialize/reset variables on entry/exit from procedures. A 
similar investigation of errors in real-time systems by 
Glass [20] showed that timing errors, omitted logic, and 
implementation errors were prevalent. 
The advent of multiprograming systems increased the 
protection problem. Processes must be protected from 
activities of each other to prevent interference. Some 
operating systems employ two modes of operation called the 
user state and the supervisor state. This simple protection 
model protected the operating system from errors in the user 
programs. The operating system cannot protect itself 
against its own errors. Example systems include IBM/360 and 
IBM/370 series of machines. Protection mechanisms such as 
file password, and memory protection keys have been used to 
guard unauthorized access to objects and crossing of address 
space boundaries. These separate protection mechanisms for 
different system resources increases the complexity of the 
operating system. This makes verification difficult [37]. 
The use of capabilities have been advocated as an 
alternative approach to protection, resource and process 
control [13, 37, 44]. A capability is an indirect pointer 
to an object with the permissible access rights on the 
object explicitly specified. In this scheme the right to 
access a resource is by possessing a capability for it. 
Capabilities are used to define execution domain of a 
proccess. Linden [35] proposed small protection domains as 
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a means to realize reliable and secure operating systems. 
In a small protection domain model, a process executes in 
different execution domains as it runs. Examples of 
operating systems based on capabilities are Hydra [45], CAP 
[44], and Intel's iMAX [27]. Capabilities are useful for 
interdomain addressing. Interdomain protection is one way 
of restricting information flow. However, there is the 
problem of intradomain addressing such as overwriting data 
areas through address variables, redefining parameters in a 
procedure thereby gaining access to more area of the calling 
environment. These are some subtle ways of incorrect 
information flow. 
The use of redundant code and data have been employed 
to detect errors in software. Redundant code is in the form 
of audit programs and process monitors. Data redundancy is 
the use of additional data fields for the purpose of error 
detection and correction. The common form of data 
redundancy are counts, identifier fields and extra pointers 
[8]. Data redundancy is widely used to provide software 
fault tolerance. An audit program is a software module that 
is responsible for ensuring that a system's data structure 
is in a consistent state. An audit program is invoked 
periodically to check the state of a storage structure to 
detect any erroneous state. An audit program has two 
functions. One function is to detect an erroneous state in 
a storage structure while the second is to correct the 
erroneous state by making use of redundant information in 
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the storage structure. A process monitor observes the 
execution of another process to detect incorrect behavior 
such as excessive use of resources(memory, disk, and CPU 
time) [22]. The DMERT operating system for Bell system 
3B20D duplex processor is one that makes extensive use of 
audit programs and redundant fields in system data 
structures to enhance error detection [22]. Audits in DMERT 
do not verify functions. They are limited to checking the 
integrity of critical data structures and resources. The 
operating system provides a facility for system processes to 
request for initialization after an error has been detected 
throuh a trap mechanism. The environment of DMERT is a 
duplicated one. The 3B20D system is a duplex system with 
loose interconnection between the processors. Other 
hardware components are also duplicated to ensure 
availabilty. Memory and disk updates are made to both 
active and redundant systems. The duplicated system state 
is one major factor for the high degree of reliability and 
availability in 3B20D/DMERT. The operating system supports 
a mechanism for software units to be updated through an 
update facility. However, it does not implement the 
recovery block concept. 
Process pairs have been implemented in some distributed 
systems. In these systems there are two copies of every 
process on different processors. These systems are mainly 
designed to provide recovery from hardware failures [5]. 
Randell [38] proposed the recovery block construct to 
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provide fault tolerance in software programs. A recovery 
block consists of a primary block with alternate blocks and 
a validation test which must be passed. A recovery block is 
free from errors if one of the blocks (primary/alternate) 
passes the validation test. To be useful the primary block 
and each alternate must be of independent design. This 
construct provides a mechanism for the temporal 
reconfiguration of a software system. Thus the scheme 
improves system availability while providing fault 
tolerance. The recovery block provides fault tolerance 
against unanticipated errors (design faults) but its use is 
limited to functional program units. Since many operating 
systems programs retain their internal state between 
activations the recovery block construct must be supporte~ 
with mechanism to reverse the effects of internal state 
changes when state restoration is required. 
A system structuring technique called data abstraction 
has been employed in the design of some operating systems 
[45, 27]. Programs modules based on this concept are called 
abstract data types. Data abstraction hides the internal 
representation of a data object from external modules but 
provides entry points to access the data object through the 
defined procedures. The procedures of the abstract data 
type module have full access to the data representation. 
When data abstraction is implemented with capability-based 
addressing, the resulting system is a set of protected 
subsystems [19, 35]. A monitor is a language construct that 
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enforces the correct sequencing of operations and data 
access protocol on a shared data object. It is employed in 
operating systems as synchronization device. A monitor and 
a semaphore are functionally equivalent but a monitor based 
process synchronization is robust. In a semaphore based 
scheme, adherence to resource access rules depends on the 
voluntary cooperation of the users of the resource. In a 
monitor based scheme, resource access rules and constraints 
are handled by the monitor on behalf of the users. A 
monitor provides the means for the safe sharing of abstract 
data types in an operating system. A monitor is a special 
implementation of an abstract type by including 
synchronization code. A monitor enforces mutual exclusive 
execution of the operations. The sh?rtcoming of abstract 
data type implementation is in the area of information 
access restriction. The procedures of these abstract 
modules have full access to the encapsulated data. If the 
procedures are only allowed to access the subcomponents of 
the data objects they require to complete their execution 
then, sources of errors can be reduced and error recovery 
can be made less expensive. A modified data abstraction 
technique that places the shared data object and the 
operation procedures in different protection domains but 
still maintains the integrity of the operations is presented 
in Chapter III. 
Error recovery is pivotal to any system that is to 
provide reliable operation. It is an important aspect of 
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localizing errors in a system. The recovery block scheme 
provides a systematic error recovery which is to restore the 
program to the state that existed before the current 
activation of the block. ·This type of recovery is called 
backward error recovery. The state restoration involves 
only the nonlocal variables (parameters and global 
variables) that the failed block modified. State 
restoration involving a set of interacting parallel 
processes can lead to a situation called "domino effect". A 
domino effect occurs when a roll-back of a failed process 
causes a roll-back of another process which causes further 
roll-back and so on. It has been shown that a system of 
interacting parallel processes is free from domino effect if 
the system is deadlock free [40]. To avoid a domino effect 
Randell [38] proposes a data transfer mechanism called a 
conversation. A conversation is a recovery block covering 
two or more processes [38]. Processes involved in a 
conversation are required to synchronize their exit. That 
is a process cannot leave the conversation until all the 
participating process have passed their acceptance tests. 
The conversation construct has the potential to deadlock if 
the process structure exhibit interdependencies which 
results in complex interactions. Other constructs that have 
been proposed to coordinate the recovery of a set of 
cooperating parallel processes are named-link recovery and 
multiprocess recovery [40]. 
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A named-link recovery block spans one or more recovery 
blocks while a multiprocess recovery block is a single 
recovery block spanning one or more processes. In a named-
link recovery block, the coupling between processes is loose 
and this makes avoidance of a domino effect or coversation 
deadlock difficult. With multi~rocess recovery block the 
linkage between processes is tight. This eliminates both 
deadlock and domino effect. The disadvantage of the 
multiprocess recovery construction is that the code for a 
process is fragmented and scattered. Also, semantics of 
some constructions are not clear. 
An experimental recovery cache to hold recovery data 
has been implemented on the PDP-11 [32]. The recovery cache 
. 
provides recovery for only main memory objects and the 
addresses used are real addresses. Thus the program must 
not be overlayed during the execution of a recovery block. 
A software implemented recovery ~ache with architectural 
support to speed-up the operation is required to support 
flexible error recovery. 
The majority of failures of computer systems is 
attributed to transient faults [31] in the hardware and 
design faults in software. To reduce the overhead 
processing associated with error recovery, it is necessary 
that the time for recovery from frequent failure modes be 
made small. The error recovery time depends on the extent 
of damage which depends on the constraint on information 
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flow through the system. The constraint on information 
flow in turn depends on how the system is structured [3]. 
To reduce the recovery time the system must avoid implicit 
interaction and information exchange between processes must 
be limited to the minimum required for a receiving process 
to complete its action. Also the actions of a process 
should not produce unidentifiable side effects. The 
elimination of unwanted side effects can reduce failures due 
to some remote causes to a very small proportion. This is 
to ensure that for most of the time the recovery action 
performed within the affected process is sufficient to 
remove the error symptom. How this can be done through 
information flow restriction is the main thrust of this 
study. 
CHAPTER III 
INFORMATION FLOW CONTROL SCHEMES 
Information flow pattern among interacting programs can 
have a significant effect on error recoverability of an 
operating system. In an uncontrolled information flow 
environment errors can have wide coverage. This can make 
error recovery costly and consequently degrade system 
performance. This chapter is concerned with techniques to 
restrict the flow of information. The chapter is focused on 
system structuring and environment control. 
System Structuring 
An operating system structure has an impact on 
modifiability, verifiability, and information flow. A well 
structured operating system should make other modules 
immuned from changes made to one of its modules. 
Verifiability is concerned with application of formal 
techniques to prove the correctness of the system. 
Information flow concerns the interaction of processes. 
Modifiability, verifiability, and information flow all 
affect operating system reliability. To structure an 
operating system to restrict information flow, relationship 




The layered approach has been employed in the 
development of operating systems [15]. In the layered 
approach the operating system is partitioned into a number 
of self contained layers. The lowest layer being the 
kernel. Each higher level layer makes use of the functions 
provided by the immediate lower level layer. The layered 
approach leads to the development of modular systems. Also, 
since each layer is self contained they can be verified and 
developed independently. The problem with the layered 
approach is partitioning the system to maintain the strict 
hierarchical relationship between layers. A structuring 
technique is proposed in the next section which retains the 
features of a modular system but in addition improves the 
least privilege principle. The least privilege states that 
a procedure should be given the smallest capability it needs 
to complete its action [19]. 
Modified Object Manager Structure 
The principle of system closure has been cited as the 
bases for secure and error-tolerant execution environments 
[13]. The closed system principle states that no process_or 
procedure has any capability which has not been explicitly 
granted. The implication of this principle is that the 
effects of all operations on a closed system shall be 
confined within that system. The ideal situation is a 
completely isolated and disjointed environments. While this 
is not possible because of process interaction the other 
best alternative is to restrict the interaction. 
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A structuring method that leads to the development of 
isolated environments is data abstraction. Data abstraction 
is a modularization technique that encapsulates a set of 
data objects and procedures that perform operations on the 
objects. Access to encapsulated data objects is through the 
invocation of operation procedures. The operations have 
full access to the data representation. Constructions 
similar to data abstraction are monitors, resources in 
synchronizing resources [1], and packages in Ada* 
programming language. Architectures and languages that 
support the use of data abstraction are said to be object 
based. Some .operating systems that have incorporated object 
orientation in their design are Hydra [45], iMAX [27], and 
CAP [44]. These operating systems provide a finer degree of 
protection. The encapsulated data objects and procedures 
are usually called type managers or object managers. The 
usual structure of an abstract type module is shown in 
Figure 1. 
The alternative structure divides the abstract type 
module into two modules. One module contains the shared 
data object and is called the manager. The second module 
contains the operations on the abstract type. The two 
modules exists in separate protection domains. The 
functions of the manager module are: 
1. maintains operations view of the object; 
2. makes available the necessary components of an 
object representation to an operation; and 





body of op1 
end op1 
procedure opn (parameters) 
body of opn 
end opn 
end name 
Figure 1. Structure of Abstract 
Data Type Module 
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To maintain operations view of object representation 
the manager only needs to identify the components and 
subcomponents of the data structure used by an operation. 
To present an operation with the necessary components of an 
object representation, the manager needs to use the 
operations view of an object and perform a projection 
operation similar to a relational database projection 
operation to construct a sub-object which is then made 
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available to the operation. Since this sub-object exists 
in a different memory location, any error that occurs during 
a type operation affects only the sub-object. Error 
recovery can be accomplished by discarding the sub-object. 
The manager provides synchronization by scheduling 
operations when the state of the object permits it. 
Requests for operations that cannot be performed immediately 
based on the current state of the object are delayed until 
an enabling state change occurs. The fact that only the 
manager has access to the object representation further 
improves the security and integrity of operations. There is 
no timing error because two operations cannot access the 
same component of the object representation. 
The proposed type manager structure is depicted in 
Figure 2. The resource variable in the manager module 
represents the shared abstract object and should be stored 
in a separate segment from the local variables of the 
manager. The statement list between begin end pair is an 
initialization code. The operation module consists of a set 
of disjoint processes which are invoked by the manager with 
actual parameters. The operations do not access the shared 
variables directly. Each process accesses only the 




object data structure definition; 
} 
local variable declarations; 
export {list of operation} in op-module; 
manager body; 
begin statement list; end 
end manager-name 
(A)' Manager Module of Proposed Structure 
operation: op-module of manager-name 
orocess: opl (parameter list) 
· body of opl; 
end opl 
process: opn (parameter list) 
body of opn; 
end opn 
end op-module 
(B) Operation Module of Proposed Structure 
Figure 2. Manager Structure 
Implementation Technique 
The implementation proposal is message based. The 
users of an abstraction send messages to the manager 
possibly with arguments requesting a type operation. The 
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manager combines the arguments with the necessary components 
of the object representation before sending it to the 
operation process. On completion of an operation the 
manager updates the state of the shared object and sends a 
response message to the operation requestor. The form of 
message communication between a manager and the operation 
processes should be by reference for efficiency reasons. 
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The form of communication between a manager and the external 
environment should depend on the architecture. In order not 
to restrict possible concurrency the operating system should 
support both blocking and nonblocking communication. A 
communication is blocking if the sender must wait until the 
message operation completes. The form of communication 
between a manager and the operation processes should be 
nonblocking. The communication between the manager and the 
external environment should be blocking. A blocking 
communication has the usual semantics of a procedure call. 
There should be a request communication channel for 
each operation, a communication channel for each response 
message, and a communication channel for each operation 
process. A communication channel should have capacity for 
one message. The channels for operation requests and 
response messages interact with the external environment 
while those for operation processes are internal to the 
object manager. -The external channels should include a 
field which indicates the state of the channel (empty/full). 
The operating system message manager sets the operation 
request channel state to full after depositing a request 
message while the object manager resets it to empty after 
consumming the message. The object manager sets response 
message channel to full while the operating system message 
manager resets it to empty after delivering the message. 
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The operation process channels should contain a field to 
indicate the return status for type operations. The manager 
sets it to a null value while the operation process sets it 
to a non null value after performing an operation. The 
value must differentiate between normal and abnormal 
terminations. 
To schedule an operation, the object manager simply 
scans the request channels until it finds one with status 
field set to full. If the operation can be performed at the 
current state of the object it is scheduled and the status 
field is reset· and the scanning continues. To respond to an 
operation it scans the status field of the operation process 
channels until it finds one with a nonnull value. It sends 
the response message and then resets the return status field 
to null value. The manager is blocked only when it sends a 
message to the external environment. To reduce storage 
overhead, the operation process channels can also be used as 
response channels. This reduces the degree of possible 
concurrency since in this case the channel is used in a 
mutual exclusive way. 
Analysis of Object Relationship 
After the operating system has been structured into a 
set of object managers, a formal evaluation of the design is 
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required to determine if the objects preserve a 
hierarchical relationship. The analysis technique is to 
define a dependency relation between pairs of abstract 
objects. As an illustration the relation --> is used to 
denote an input-output relation among objects. If A and B 
are any two abstract objects and A --> B holds, then object 
A is used as input to produce object B. The analysis is to 
verify that the following properties are satisfied: 
1. reflexive: A --> A holds for every object; 
2. antisymmetric: If A --> B, then B --> A must not 
hold. 
3. transitive: If A --> B, and B --> C then A --> C 
holds. 
The reflexive property is trivially true. An object can 
be both an input and output to itself. The antisymmetric 
property avoids the possibility of infinite recursion. 
Symmetric relationship makes error recovery difficult 
because of the difficulty in knowing how the· objects have 
changed each others state. It is also difficult to 
determine a consistent previous state. 
The transitive property defines a flow path between objects. 
This path is.a recovery path to be traversed when an error 
is detected in an object. The preservation of these 
properties ensures that the input-output relation do not 
form a cycle. Cycle formation can increase cost of error 
recovery because it makes the determination of a consistent 
previous state very difficult. 
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To remove a symmetric relationship between any two 
objects, the objects can be merged into ~ single object with 
a new manager. The formal approach is only part of the 
design process and should be used whenever new objects are 
defined. 
The specification of a manager must include: 
1. legal sequences of operation invocations; this 
includes precedence, exclusive, and parallel constraints on 
operation invocations; 
2. blocking and nonblocking communications; and 
3. type of operations on each message channel {i.e 
send, receive, and send-receive). 
A manager must be subjected to formal proof to verify its 
logical correctness. The verification of a manager need not 
take the usual form of sequential proof (i.e., loop 
termination) because a resource manager or scheduler can be 
implemented with a nonterminating loop. What is required is 
to show that the control decisions conform to the 
specification. The verification should consist of proving: 
1. that precedence and exclusive constraints on 
operation invocations are satisfied; 
2. that the right mode of communication is employed at 
interaction points; and 
3. that the correct message operation is applied on 
each message channel. 
There are two types of precedence constraints to 
consider. The first is total precedence constraint. If A 
and B are two operations and A precedes B always, then the 
precedence constraint is total. To prove total precedence 
constraint between two operations A and B it must be shown 
that the following four conditions hold: 
(a) precondition(A) /\ precondition(B) = false; 
(b) precondition(A) /\ postcondition(A) = false; 
(c) postcondition(A) /\ precondition(B) = true; 
(d) precondition(B) /\ postcondition(B) = false. 
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The first condition prevents the simultaneous invocation of 
both operations. Conditions (b) and (d) ensure that neither 
operation succeeds itself. The third condition ensures that 
B is invocable after A. 
The second type of precedence constraint is a partial 
precedence constraint. An object that exhibits a partial 
precedence contraint is a stack with the operations push and 
pop. The invocation constraints are: 
exclusive: push, pop; 
precedence: push; (push I pop)* 
The precedence constraint specifies that a pop operation 
cannot be invoked without a previously completed push 
operation. To prove conformity to partial precedence 
constraint it is only required to show that condition (c) 
holds. Also both total and partial precedence proofs must 
show that precondition(A) becomes true before 
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precondition(B) does. 
Let S be the set of operations on an object and let x 
be an exclusive operation. Let R = S - {x}. To verify that 
the execution of the operation x is exclusive, it must be 
shown that if precondition(x) is true, then for all y in R 
precondition(y) is false. The verification of correct 
communication mode and correct application of message 
operations on message channels do not require formal proof. 
They can be accomplished by visual inspection by comparing 
the specification with the implementation code. This can 
also be complemented with compile-time and run-time 
checking. 
Environment Control 
Environment control is concerned with establishing a 
reliable execution environment for programs. An operating 
system must provide isolated process environments in order 
to reduce the scope of an error. To achieve this an 
operating system should prevent interference among 
processes. Processes can interfere through improper 
resource control, process control, and protection mechanism. 
Also, environment isolation requires that the privilege to 
access an environment should not be implied from the 
trustworthiness of a process as is usually the case in 
systems based on hierarchy of privileges. Protection 
mechanism based_ on privilege level implies an inclusion 
property. A process of higher privilege can access the 
environment of a process with lower privilege without 
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restrictions. The implication of this is that an error in 
a high privilege environment can affect lower privilege 
environment also. The error coverage cannot be easily 
determined because the information flow pattern is not well 
defined. 
The key to a reliable environment control is avoidance 
of implicit interaction between environments and within an 
environment. The issues discussed in this section are 
protection, resource control and process control. 
Protection 
A protection mechanism can be envisioned as an 
environment in which a procedure or process executes within 
a protection wall having some exit gates. Each gate leads 
to a different environment. The gates are the means through 
which the procedure or process can interact with other 
environments. The gates represent calls to other procedures 
or access to global data objects or actual parameters from 
some calling environment. 
gate 
gate Procedure· gate 
gate 
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The way the gates are defined determines the degree of 
protection provided by the wall. The gates are information 
flow outlets. Errors also propagate to neighbouring 
environments through the gates. The wall is strong when the 
gates are explicitly defined and also few in number. The 
number of gates depends to some extent on the system 
decomposition method and also on the size of a program unit. 
A system decomposed into a hierarchy of self contained 
subsystems presents a well defined interdependency among 
subsystems. A robust protection mechanism should prevent 
errors in one subsystem from extending to other subsystems. 
A protection model that supports environment isolation 
is the concept of protection domains. A protection domain 
is an environment that defines all the access rights and 
operations on objects available to a procedure within the 
domain [35]. The implementation of protection domains 
requires a means to express the access rights and operations 
on objects available to a procedure and also a means to 
check at run-time that a procedure's actions are consistent 
with its access constraints. 
Capability Based Implementation 
An elegant scheme for the implementation of protection 
domains is the capability based scheme. A capability is an 
absolute address for a virtual object [18]. Capability 
based addressing is an addressing scheme in which every 
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system object is addressed through a capability [14]. A 
capability includes the set of rights permissible on an 
object. A right that is not granted cannot be exercised by 
the holder of a capability. Example operating systems whose 
protection is based on capabilities are Hydra [45], iMAX 
[27], and CAP [44]. 
The environment of a procedure is defined by a list of 
capabilities for the objects it can access. The only means 
to access an object is by possessing a capability for the 
object. Thus a process cannot come into the execution 
environment of another process except by explicit 
arrangement (passing capabilities). Also, any detected 
error during a process execution is confined within the 
interacting environments. 
A capability based scheme has an efficiency problem. 
Perhaps this could be the reason for the paucity of 
capability machines. The efficiency problem involves both 
time and space. It takes several words to represent a 
capability. Thus many memory accesses are required for 
capability operations. A software implementation of 
capabilities can slow down the system. A consequence of 
addressing all objects by capabilities is that once the 
capability of an object is destroyed, the object is no 
longer addressable. This is called the "lost key" problem 
[37]. An alternative implementation of protection domains 
based on privilege numbers is presented in the next section. 
Privilege Number Implementation 
of Protection Domains 
The capability based scheme though flexible cannot be 
easily implemented in conventional architectures. The 
reason being that capability based addressing favors 
machines with object orientation. ·An alternative 
implementation of protection domains that is implementable 
in conventional architectures is proposed in this section. 
The proposal is based on the use of privilege numbers. 
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The structuring of an operating system based on the 
notion of data abstraction creates a set of subsystems which 
interact through well defined interfaces. Each subsystem is 
a protection domain and is assigned a unique privilege 
number. Every data object and procedure in a protection 
domain is identified with the same privilege number. The 
difference between this scheme and other privilege 
mechanisms such as supervisor/user modes and ~ecurity 
classes in security sensitive environments is that the 
privilege number does not imply a nested or an inclusion 
property. The basis for accessing any object is similar to 
capability based scheme. A process must possess the 
privilege number of the object(domain) and a secondary 
privilege which specifies the subset of the operations the 
process can perform on, the object. The object m~nager 
interpretes the secondary privilege since it is object 
dependent. 
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The system (operating system/architecture) embeds the 
privilege number in the data object and procedure descriptor 
data structures and this can be checked on first access. 
Since the assignment of privilege numbers is based on the 
static structure of the operating system, the set of 
privilege numbers is fixed and few in number. The operating 
system kernel can maintain a table which indicates the 
correspondence between privilege numbers and subsystems. A 
two-byte privilege number is sufficient for both user and 
operating system needs. The privilege numbers assigned to 
users can be reused when a user exits the system. This 
necessitates a second table to store available privilege 
numbers. 
To control the transfer of privileges, access control 
bits for read, write, copy, and delete are added to the 
privilege number. Also, to provide a finer degree of access 
control four additional mask bits are added to mask those 
rights that cannot be exported by the holder of the 
privilege. The masking sc~eme is proposed by Corsini and 
Frosini [11] for capabilities. Altogether three bytes are 
sufficient to represent access privilege to an object with 
the required restrictions. 
The advantage of this scheme over a capability based 
scheme are simplicity, time, and space efficiency. 
Simplicity comes from the static assignment. Every object 
(process/data) belongs to exactly one domain identified by a 
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fixed privilege number. It is time and space efficient 
because privilege number operations do not require hashing 
and few memory references are required for access checking. 
Use of Descriptors 
In some programming languages the addressing 
environment of a procedure is determined by lexical nesting 
level, its placement in a source file, and by performing 
address arithmetic on pointer variables and procedure 
parameters. Each of these schemes can increase the address 
space of a procedure. A procedure can modify unrelated 
locations through the use of pointer variables. This leads 
to an incorrect information flow. In C programming language 
where pointer manipulation is similar to array indexing, 
passing a scalar variable by reference to a procedure 
exposes adjoining locations of the calling environment to 
the called environment. The use of descriptors to describe 
pointers can prevent such exposure. 
A descriptor is a control word that describes areas of 
data and program storage [7]. The important attribute of a 
descriptor is that it defines the storage area occupied by 
an object. It can be used to provide finer degree of 
protection because any access outside the defined area can 
be detected by the system. Descriptors have been employed 
to describe arrays and segments in Burroughs B6700 [7]. The 
use of descriptors to pass procedure parameters can restrict 
interenvironment interaction. This is because descriptors 
can be used to define scalars, array slices and 
substrings. 
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A disadvantage of descriptors is that it requires space 
to store the descriptor information. However, with 
efficient coding and support for variable length descriptors 
the space overhead can be made small. In a reliability 
conscious environment this small extra storage is worth it. 
A proposed descriptor layout for a pointer variable is 
. 
Field 
type: (scalar, array, string) 
unit-size: (1, 2, 4, 8) 









8 1 16 1 24 
24 
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40 1 48 1 s6 
The unit-size field specifies one of the primitive machine 
data types: character (1), two-byte integer (2), four-byte 
integer/real (4), and double word (8). The length code 
specifies how many bytes used to represent the length of a 
nonscalar type. If the length code is one, then size of the 
array/string is the value stored in the next byte of the 
descriptor. The number-of-units field gives the length of 
the array/string. The base-address is the location of the 
first byte of the storage area. One of the extra bits can 
be used for access control to permit either read or write. 
When the type field is scalar the number-of-units field is 
redundant in which case the descriptor size is reduced to 32 
bits. Thus for scalars the use of descriptors do not 
introduce any storage overhead. 
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The support for descriptors in an architecture requires 
two special instructions. The first instruction is for the 
construction of descriptors and the second is a descriptor 
decode instruction. 
In languages where dynamic memory allocation and 
deallocation is supported, more than one pointer variable 
can simultaneously locate the same area. When the area is 
freed without setting all the associated pointer variables 
to a null value, subsequent use of the variables can lead to 
chaos. The area could have been reallocated to a different 
procedure or could contain garbage. In the first case the 
procedure is implicitly exposed to an external environment, 
while in the second situation an incorrect data value is 
used by the procedure. In either case there is an incorrect 
information flow. The correction of this type of error is 
very difficult because of the difficulty in locating the 
error. The damage to the system state can be extensive. 
This type of error can be detected through the use of 
descriptors and privilege numbers. One of the extra bits in 
a descriptor can be used to indicate the type of area 
(dynamic or static) referenced by the pointer. For 
dynamically allocated storage areas the privilege number of 
that procedure is prepended to the area. When an area is 
freed, the contents is cleared and any subsequent reference 
to that area by the same procedure results in a nonmatching 
privilege number. 
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Resource Management Issues 
The control of system resources is an important 
function of an operating system. Resource usage is a major 
source of interaction between processes in the system. The 
following are aspects of resource control: 
1. maintenance of resource state: 
2. keeping track of resource allocation: 
3. applying appropriate locks on resources. 
The possible states of a resource must be identified. In 
general terms the states free and allocated must be 
distinguished. A resource is free if it is not currently 
assigned to any process and is usable. In a free state, a 
resource must not contain any information from previous use 
that can affect another process in an undesired way. This 
ensures that a process does not inherit any part of another 
process environment except by explicit arrangement. A 
resource unit is allocated if it is assigned to a process. 
The state transitions of resource units must be enforced. 
In each state the possible state transitions must be defined 
with their enabling events. For instance, a memory frame 
changes from free to allocated if these conditions are 
satisfied: 
1. there is a request for memory space: 
2. the contents of the frame is cleared: 
3. the frame is free. 
A state must not be altered before an operation completes. 
For example, a disk page must not be marked free until it is 
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deleted from a file map and subsequently cleared. 
Keeping track of resource allocation involves 
maintenance of assignment information. This depends on 
whether there are identical units of the resource or not. 
For identical units the allocator must partition the units 
into equivalence classes based on the units states. One 
equivalence class must be those units currently allocated to 
some computations. Another class are those units that are 
free. Other equivalence classes are possible depending on 
type of resource. These partitions must be identified and 
the rules for transition from one partition to another must 
be enforced by the resource manager. These classes form the 
possible states of the resource. The sum over the 
cardinality of each partition must be equal to the number of 
resource units. This invariant must be true always. 
Another aspect of keeping assignment information is 
associating a resource unit with a process. This requires 
using some redundant information in the resource descriptor. 
The approach is to use lock and key scheme. When a resource 
unit is assigned to a process a lock is generated and 
included in the resource descriptor. The same lock is given 
to the process to which the resource is assigned. To a lock 
holder the lock acts as a key to unlock the resource. The 
use of the resource is permitted on presentation of the 
correct key. This ensures that only certified processes 
gain access to a resource. 
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As an illustration consider a pool of memory frames 
controlled by the memory manager. Initially all frames are 
free and cleared. To allocate a frame the memory manager 
must take the following steps: 
1. select a free frame; 
2. generate a lock for the selected frame; 
3. place the frame in allocated list; 
4. update the resource allocation information; and 
5. return frame-id, lock ) to requestor. 
To deallocate a frame the following steps must be taken: 
1. match key and lock; 
2. clear the frame; 
3. place the cleared frame in free list; and 
4. update the resource allocation information. 
In both allocation and deallocation the first step is 
crucial. If the first step fails in the case of allocation 
the request cannot be satisfied immediately. If the first 
step fails in the case of deallocation it represents an 
error situation and the operation must be rejected. There 
are three possible states of a frame - free, allocated, and 
deallocated. The permissible state transitions is shown in 
Figure 3. 
A process should exercise control on a shared data 
object for the duration of an operation. In the UNIX 
system, simultaneous editing of a file by two different 
processes is allowed. An operating system must ensure 
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integrity of operations while providing concurrency. By 
viewing file editing as a transaction with many updates 
that must not be interleaved, the operating system needs to 
support two different write locks to model the lifetimes of 
file operations. In edit mode a file should not be shared 
until it is released at the end of the edit session. 
I free ~==~:~::_::~~=---->! allocated 
-------~-----
cleared release frame 
----------------------------------~----
' deallocated I 
Figure 3. State Transition of a Memory Frame 
An example 
An important object maintained by an operating system 
is user files. Let the acces~ (rights) defined on a file 
object be execute, read, write, edit, and delete. Some 
systems do not make these distinctions but instead base file 
operations on read, write, and execute protection used for 
memory objects. The following file types are distinguished: 
directory, executable file, stream file, and record file~ 
The permitted user access for each file type is as 
follows: 
directory: read, delete; 
executable file: execute, delete; 
stream file: delete, edit, read, write; and 
record file: delete, read, write. 
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The right to delete a file must be controlled only by the 
file creator. With this approach, possession of write 
access by a process does not grant the process the right to 
delete the file. 
To control the use of a file properly by user 
processes, three types of locks will be admnistered on a 
file. The locks depend on the semantics of the operations 
on a file. The operations which do not change contents. of a 
file will be given a read lock. The operations which make a 
single update at a time will be given a short write lock 
(swl), while those operations that make many updates at a 
time will be assigned an exclusive write lock (ewl). The 
difference in swl and ewl is in the lifetimes of the file 
usage. A file with an ewl is released after a close request 
is issued by the current user. The locks for each file 
operation is: 
read: read lock; 





With this information, the manager is be able to prevent 
an attempt to perform an unauthorized access to a file. It 
also improves file sharing among users since write access 
and delete access are separate. 
Process Management 
The process is the active and schedulable entity in the 
operating system. It uses various system resources as it 
performs its action. Processes interact by sharing physical 
and logical resources. The interaction influences the 
execution of a process and if not properly controlled 
processes can interfere with each other in undesired ways. 
The support for concurrency improves resource utilization 
and computa·tion speed and also increases the chance of 
undesired interference. The process control functions are: 
1. specification of a process domain; and 
2. concurrency control. 
The domain of a process is part of the system 
environment it can sense or alter. This comprises physical 
resources and virtual objects such as data, code, message 
channels. A robust means to specify a domain is by use of 
capabilities or by the proposed privilege number scheme. 
Concurrency Control. A concurrency control mechanism 
must ensure that processes do not interfere with each other 
in undesired ways. The desirable attributes of a 
concurrency control mechanism are: 
1. noninterference from concurrent execution; 
2. proper ordering of operations on shared objects; 
3. unsuccessful and incomplete operations should not 
alter an object's state; and 
4. freedom from deadlock. 
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The noninterference requirement is necessary to prevent the 
invalidation of an action by one process due to a concurrent 
action by another process. This is possible if an object is 
subject to concurrent access. To guarantee noninterference 
it is imperative that the operating system locks an object 
for the duration of an operation. Alternatively the 
operating system must ensure that two processes do not have 
access to the same parts of a shared object where concurrent 
access is permitted. This is the approach taken in the 
proposed manager structure. 
The ordering of operations on shared objects is 
necessary to ensure that operations conform to a legal 
sequence. Operation ordering is concerned with enforcing 
dependency constraints between operations and also delaying 
an operation until a certain enabling event occurs. The 
proper ordering of operations can avoid extensive backup in 
the event of an error. The ordering of operations should 
depend on both the current state of the object and on the 
type of operation requested. As an example, a FIFO queue 
object with the operations insert and remove should delay a 
request for remove operation if the queue is empty. It 
could allow parallel execution of remove and insert provided 
there are previously completed insert operations. 
43 
The third requirement ensures that an object is not 
observed in an intermediate state by other concurrent 
operations. It also ensures that operations that terminate 
unsuccessfully do not damage the object state. This 
guarantees that an object moves from one consistent state to 
another consistent state. The enforcement of this 
requirement can reduce the scope of an error. This property 
is refered to as recoverability property in transaction 
based systems [41]. 
The fourth desirable property of any synchronization 
technique is to ensure the entire system is deadlock free. 
In a fault tolerant operating system a deadlock can be very 
costly. A deadlock recovery involves rolling back one of 
the processes involved in a deadlock to a safe state. The 
determination of a safe state is not simple because 
interactions must be undone. If a rolled back process has 
interacted with other processes then the affected processes 
must also be rolled back. Thus a single rollback can lead 
to a chain of rollbacks. Taking into consideration the 
difficulty of deadlock recovery it is safer to adopt a 
deadlock avoidance policy in the design of a fault tolerant 
operating system. 
Structuring an operating system based on the manager 
construct reduces this possibility because protocols and 
constraints on resource use are enforced in the manager. 
The fact that managers are processes not subject to 
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exclusive access also reduces the possibility of circular 
wait which is a necessary condition for deadlock. However, 
to avoid deadlock there is need to impose a call hierarchy 
on intermanager communication. A formal technique is-
necessary to reduce the amount of run-time checks. The 
following steps are suggested: 
1. determine the dependency relations of managers; 
2. verify the dependency relations; 
3. derive a synchronization graph from the 
dependencies; and 
4. implement a graph manager to enforce the 
dependencies. 
To determine dependency relations of managers it is 
only necessary to know the communication partners of each 
manager. Two managers are communication partners if there 
is a direct information transfer between them via sending of 
messages. If a manager M can send a message to another 
manager N, then M > N (read M calls N). It means N obtains 
input from M. The send operation should not be symmetric. 
That is if M calls N, then N must not call M. To avoid this 
the system kernel must support send and receive message 
primitives. 
The verification of dependency is limited to 
interaction across interfaces. The steps to be taken are: 
1. verify the existence of matching communication 
between partners; 
2. derive preconditions and postconditions for 
communication; 
3. consider all possible states of the managers taken 
together. 
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A matching communication occurs when a send statement in one 
process/manager has a corresponding receive statement in a 
second process at the point of communication. As an 
example, consider the processes M, and N: 
Process M 
• • • 
receive from N {argument list) . . . 
end M 
Process N 
• • • 
receive from M {argument list) . 
end N 
In this example M and N do not form a matching communication 
because each is waiting to receive data from the other. In 
fact both processes are permanently blocked {deadlocked). 
When a matching pair is established, the next step is to 
verify that precondition{send) /\ precondition(receive) and 
postcondition{send) /\ postcondition{receive) are true. 
This guarantees that the managers will make progress in the 
absence of deadlock. The final step is to take all managers 
together by combining all the preconditions{send) and 
postconditions(receive). The verification in this step is 
to show that some states are impossible to reach and those 
reachable are valid. A proof technique for sequential 
processes is presented in Levin and Gries [34]. 
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The synchronization graph is simply a call graph based 
on the established dependencies between managers. It 
confirms or disproves the formal proof of the previous step. 
The system is deadlock free if the ,graph is cycle free and 
the formal proof result shows a deadlock free system. If 
there is a disagreement between the graph and result of the 
formal proof the system design should be reviewed and the 
formal analysis repeated until a deadlock free system 
emerges. The advantage of the formal analysis is that it is 
done during the design stage. 
The implementation of a graph manager is to provide 
run-time checks for interprocess communications. The graph 
manager allows a manager to send a message to another 
manager if the nodes corresponding to the two managers are 
adjacent (path length between nodes is 1) and the 
interaction is a valid transition along the path. The graph 
manager is able to detect illegal interactions with this 
approach. 
Semaphore Based Process Control. The use of semaphores 
for controlling access to shared data was proposed by 
Dijkstra [15]. A semaphore is an integer variable on which 
two indivisible operations P(S) and V(S) are defined. Given 
a semaphore S, P(S) is defined as : 
If S > 0 then S := S-1 else wait; while V(S) is defined as: 
S := S+l. A process that wants to access a shared variable 
x, executes P(S) and if unsuccessful is blocked until S > 0. 
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On the other hand, if P(S) is successful, then Pl proceeds 
and after accessing the variable x executes V(S) which frees 
x. In using a semaphore the synchronization code becomes 
part of a process algorithm. There is thus no separation 
between the algorithm defining a process action and the 
constraints on its execution. This is a drawback of 
semaphore based process control mechanism. A second 
drawback is that its use is error prone. If either of P(S) 
or V(S) step is omitted, there could be concurrent access to 
a variable or a deadlock. Lastly semaphore programs are not 
well structured. The use of global variables by concurrent 
processes expose the processes to erroneous actions of each 
other. The semaphore based synchronization scheme does not 
provide a good information flow model. 
Monitor Based Process Control. The monitor concept was 
developed to enforce mutual exclusive access to shared 
resources. A monitor is a program module with a set of 
shared variables and a set of procedures that define 
operations on the shared variables. A monitor is a passive 
entity. A process that wants to use the resource maintained 
by the monitor invokes the appropriate monitor procedure 
that performs the action.- The execution of the monitor 
procedures are mutually exclusive. Hoare [23] proposed the 
use of condition variable to provide condition 
synchronization. The operations defined on a condition 
variable are signal and wait. The condition variable 
provides the means to order operations. 
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The enforcement of mutual exclusion in monitor use can 
have undesirable side effects depending on the 
implementation scheme. There are two common implementation 
schemes - disabling of interrupts and use of semaphores 
[36]. The disabling of interrupts can have a drastic effect 
on the system if critical device signals are not responded 
to on time. Interrupt inhibition has the effect of global 
exclusion on all monitors whereas intergrity of monitor 
operations only requires exclusion on individual-monitors. 
There are two pontential problems with this approach. The 
first is the possibility of missing some necessary 
interrupts and the second is the unnecessary restriction of 
possible concurrency. 
The use of semaphores to control entrance to monitors 
introduces another level of synchronization. The semaphore 
approach provides mutual exclusion on individual monitors. 
The semaphore scheme is prone to deadlock in the presence of 
nested monitor calls. 
To meet the third requirement of synchronization the 
monitor must take extra steps because it is not structured 
to meet error recoverability requirement. The steps to be 
taken by a monitor are: 
1. save the current state of the shared data at the 
commencement of an operation; or 
2. provide an inverse procedure to undo the effects of 
a normal procedure to be called when an error is detected. 
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If an operation is not invertible then the only option is 
step 1. Without augumenting a monitor with the extra steps 
suggested above, processes are not immuned from the effects 
of an unsuccessful operation by another process. Monitors 
have the same expressive power with semaphores. The 
advantage of a monitor over semaphore is that monitors 
enhace program modularity. 
Proposed Manager Scheme. The proposed type manager 
structure is both a synchronization and a fault tolerant 
device. The manager only encapsulates a shared data object. 
The operations on the shared data are implemented as 
processes independent of each order and the manager. The 
problem of contention among operations is eliminated because 
an operation can only be invoked by a manager. 
The manager is able to order operations properly 
because all requests for object operations are channeled to 
the manager which then calls the appropriate operation. An 
operation request that cannot be serviced immediately is 
left in the request message buffer until such a time that 
the shared object state permits it. Thus operation ordering 
is effected without scheduling queues associated with 
monitors and semaphores. 
The proposed manager has a recoverability property. 
Incomplete operations cannot modify the state of an object. 
The manager is able to distinguish between successful and 
unsuccessful operations through the return code field in the 
operation process message. The fact that an operation does 
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not have an exlusive control of a manager reduces the 
chance of deadlock. By designing the system of managers to 
have a hierachical structure deadlock can be avoided. 
Of the three synchronization techniques the proposed manager 
scheme is the most elegant. 
Summary 
Information flow issues that can improve error recovery 
have been discussed. A modified structure for sharing 
abstract data objects called a manager is presented. The 
structure hides the full representation of a shared object 
from the operations, but presents partial representations to 
operations. A formal technique for analyzing relationships 
between subsystems (managers) based on input-output relation 
is also discussed. The analysis checks if the object 
relations form a partial order. Proof technique for 
verifying individual manager scheduling algorithm is also 
presented. The use of privilege numbers to implement 
protection domains is proposed as an alternative to 
expensive capability based implementation. Also presented 
is a descriptor based scheme for representing pointer 
variables which can be used to pass parameters in procedure 
calls. 
CHAPTER IV 
ERROR DETECTION AND RECOVERY 
The reliability of a system is increased by built-in 
redundancies to detect errors and to recover from the 
errors. These redundancies take the form of additional 
components and actions which are not necessary for correct 
system behavior in a fault free system. The redundancies 
are unavoidable overheads in a fault tolerant system. The 
usual forms of redundancy are functional, information, and 
time redundancies. 
Functional redundancy is the use of standby components 
(program or hardware) to take over when a primary module 
fails as a result of a fault. The recovery block is type of 
functional redundancy for software modules. Information or 
data redundancy is the use of additional data in data 
structures to detect and correct an erroneous data state. 
Common forms of information redundancy are counts, 
identifier fields, and extra pointers. Information 
redundancy is perhaps the most applied form of redundancy in 
software systems. Time redundancy is the use of more time 
to perform an action. This include instruction, and 
function retries. All forms of redundancy are necessary to 




The detection of error in a system is a crucial step in 
any reliable system. The process. involves distinguishing 
between an acceptable and unacceptable data states in the 
various stages of a computation. Run-time checks are then 
applied to check conformance of a program to its 
specification. Any deviation is then signalled as an error 
which is then followed by a corrective or recovery action. 
Since these run-time checks increase execution time of a 
program these checks should be minimized. The checks can be 
reduced by restricting them to interaction points such as 
procedure calls, and interprocess communications. A program 
module must check the validity of information received from 
other modules and information transmitted to other program 
units. Thus every program has at least two points to detect 
errors. The first is a test of the program's input data and 
the second is a test of the program's output (See Figure 4). 
---------------- module 
-->1 input check execution output check 1---> 
error error 
------>--1. failure 1---<-----
Figure 4. Possible Error Detection Points 
in a Module 
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There are three basic methods employed for error 
detection. These are structural, algorith~ic, and temporal 
methods [31]. The structural method uses a redundant sys~em 
structure to detect errors. An example is a duplex system 
operating in parallel. A computation is correct if output 
from both systems are identical and satisfy an acceptance 
criteria. The algorithmic method is a dynamic verification 
scheme. It employs run-time assertions to detect errors. 
The temporal method consists of monitoring the execution 
time of processes. A common mechanism is the use of time-
outs. 
The choice of a method depends on the size and type of 
a module. A module is classified as either functional or 
nonfunctional. A functional module does not retain its 
internal state between activations. The output of a 
functional module is always dependent on the current input. 
A nonfunctional module on the otherhand, retains its 
internal state between activations. Examples of 
nonfunctional modules are process schedulers, monitors, and 
resource controllers. The output of a nonfunctional module 
depends on the current input and the internal state. 
An error in a program unit is due to error in the input 
data, or error in the internal state for a nonfunctional 
module, or a fault in the algorithm defining a program. The 
algoritmic fault is due to a design fault in the algorithm 
(software or hardware), or a hardware failure. The 
detection of input error can be accomplished by the use of 
assertions· (validity tests) while audits and other 
detection methods are required to detect errors in the 
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internal state of a nonfunctional program unit. The use of . 
audits for error detection and correction is described in 
[8, 22]. 
The error detection algorithm should be well designed 
and subjected to formal verification techniques. The 
verification must show that the code always terminates and 
does not modify the internal state of the processing 
program. It must also show that valid states of programs 
are not rejected and that only erroneous states are 
rejected. All functional modules should be formally 
verified. The proof must show that a functional module 
terminates for both valid and invalid input data. Time-outs 
can be employed to detect incorrect behavior of any 
functional program unit induced by a fault in a hardware 
component. 
Control Error Detection 
in Nonfunctional Processes 
A mechanism to detect control errors within a 
nonfunctional module such as the manager construct proposed 
in chapter three is presented. A nonfunctional process that 
schedules the use of a shared object must include exclusive, 
precedence, and parallel constraints on operations 
invocations. The method is based on separating the control 
algorithm from the processing algorithm and then adding 
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assertion statements affecting only control data to detect 
any violation of scheduling constraints. The control 
algorithm is called a "decision-maker". The manager must 
call the decision-maker to make the next decision based on 
the current control data state and the requested operation. 
The manager confirms or rejects the decision by executing an 
assertion that must be true for the decision made. 
The decision-maker implementation consists of defining 
a finite state control device that models the operations 
invocation constraints. The state transitions are augmented 
with preconditions and events relating the control state 
data. On invocation, the decision-maker either allows the 
requested operation to proceed immediately, or delays the 
request, or signal an error if the control state data is in 
error. 
An example is a process that controls the access to 
stored data. There are two groups of processes that access 
the stored data called readers and writers [23]. The 
readers read the current data values and the writers update 
the state of the shared data. Readers are allowed to 
proceed in parallel but only one writer is permitted to gain 
access to the stored data when there are no readers. Also, 
waiting readers have higher priority than waiting writers at 
the end of a write and no new readers should be permitted if 
there are waiting writers. 
To model this control problem, the decision-maker 
defines a finite state control that satisfies the 
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constraints, a set of decision variables, the actions 
associated with each state transition, and the preconditions 
for each state transition. The states of the finite state 
control and their meanings are: 
nrnw: no readers and no writers (initial state); 
rnww: reading without waiting writers; 
rww : reading with waiting writers; 
wnwr: writing without waiting readers; and 
wwr : writing with waiting readers. The decision 
variables are: 
nw number of writers ( 0 or 1) ; 
nr number of readers ( 0 or > 0) ; 
nwr: number of waiting readers (0 or > 0) ; 
nww: number of waiting writers ( 0 or> 0). The 
following action codes are defined: 
ok . operation can proceed; . 
gw enqueue write request in waiting list of writers; 
qr enqueue read request in waiting list of readers; 
dqr: allow a waiting reader to proceed; 
dqw: allow a waiting writer to proceed. The finite 
state control is shown in Figure 5. The arcs are labelled 
with triples (a, b, c), where 
a: is a transition number; 
b: is a requested operation ( r =read, w =write); and 




( 6, -, dqw) 
( 12, w, qw) 
(3, r, ok) 
( 7, r, qr) 
( 14, w, qw) 
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( 13 , r, qr) 
( 4' w' 
( 4, w, qw) 
Figure 5. Finite State Control of Readers and Writers 
Synchronization Problem 
preconditions for each state transition are: 
state transition precondition 
nrnw 1 nw = nr = nwr = nww = 0 & b = r 
2 nw = nr = nwr = nww = 0 & b = w 
rnww 3 nr > 0 & (nww = nw = nwr = 0) & b = r 
4 nr > 0 & (nw = nwr = nww = 0) -& b = w 
9 nr = nw = nwr = nww = 0 
wnwr 7 (nr = nwr = 0) & nw = l & b = r 
12 (nr = nwr = 0) & nw = 1 & b = w 
6 (nr = nw = nwr = 0) & nww > 0 
rww 6 already defined 
5 (nr = nw = 0) & nwr > 0 & nww > 0 
13 nr > 0 & nww > 0 & nw = 0 & b = r 





(nr = nw = 0) & (nwr > 0 & nww > 0) 
(nw = nr = nww = 0) & nwr > 0 
already defined 
nw = 1 & nwr > 0 & nr = 0 & b = w 
In order to be able to recover from control errors, 
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redundant data fields should be added to the headers for the 
waiting lists. One redundant field that is necessary is the 
number of elements in the list. Another necessary redundant 
information is the previous state of the finite state 
control. 
One advantage of this approach is that the internal 
state of a nonfunctional module is partitioned into control 
data state and shared data state. With the manager 
construct the type of error can be determined from the 
program unit that det~cts it. The manager and the 
decision-maker manipulate the control data while the 
operation procedures manipulate the shared data. This helps 
to restrict the sources of internal state error and also 
helps to categorize an error. Errors detected by a manager 
or a decision-maker are classified as control error, while 
errors detected by operations and users of the shared data 
are classified as data error. Another advantage of this 
scheme is that it facilitates error correction because the 
program units to check for type of error are known. This 
has a beneficial effect on error recovery. The error 
recovery action is restricted to the part of the internal 
state affected by an error. 
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Error Recovery 
After an error is detected a recovery action must be 
taken to undo the effects of the error and possibly repair 
the error. Error recovery is essentially re~toring the 
system to a state where processing can resume. To restore 
the system to a globally consistent state a knowledge of the 
recovery space is required. In concurrent systems such as 
an operating system the interactions of processes can 
complicate error recovery. An error in one process in a set 
of parallel processes can lead to extensive state 
restoration. 
There are two types of error recovery mechanisms called 
backward and forward error recovery. Backward error 
recovery consists of restoring the system to the state that 
existed at the beginning of a recovery point. A recovery 
point is a point in a program where the current state of a 
program is saved. Backward error recovery provides recovery 
for unanticipated errors. An unanticipated error is a 
design error present in a software or hardware from the 
outset that remained undetected during testing but manifests 
itself due to rare combination of circumstances. The system 
programmer does not specify any action for the handling of 
the error because of lack of knowledge for its existence. 
These errors are attributed to design faults in hardware and 
software. Forward error recovery is applied to anticipated 
errors. The recovery involves a corrective action to remove 
the error symptom. Forward error recovery can be handled 
through exception handling facility of a programming 
language. These recovery methods are complementary. 
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The recovery from errors affecting system data 
structures is handled effectively by audits. Audits can be 
used to recover from control state error. Since every state 
of a finite state control has a unique assertion, the 
control state audit can determine which control variable 
causes the failure of an assertion. It then uses the 
redundant fields in the waiting request list and previous 
state values to correct the error. Suppose the finite state 
control of Figure 5 is in state nrnw (initial state) and the 
value of nwr is not zero. The assertion statement for the 
state nrnw requires the variable nwr to be zero. The 
variable nwr makes the assertion fail. The audit makes use 
of the fact that the queue length for waiting readers must 
be equal to nwr. If the value of this redundant field in 
the queue header is zero and the header pointer is null, 
then the error is corrected by setting nwr to zero. 
Recovery Block Interface 
The recovery block was proposed to provide software 
fault tolerance against residual design faults in both 
software and hardware algorithms. The syntax of a recovery 
• 
block is 
ensure <acceptance test> 
by <primary alternate> 
else by <second alternate> 
else by <nth alternate> 
else error 
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The semantics of the recovery block is as follows: on block 
entry, the primary alternate is tried. This is then 
followed by the execution of the acceptance test algorithm. 
If the test yields true, then the results are accepted and a 
block exit is taken. However, if t~e acceptance test fails,_ 
backward error recovery is initiated which consists of 
restoring the program state to what it was before entering 
the block. The backward error recovery is then followed 
with an automatic transfer to another alternate and the 
sequence repeated. If no alternate passes the acceptance 
test, then the block has failed and an error condition is 
raised. 
One good advantage of the recovery block is that it 
provides a convenient checkpoint. When recovery blocks are 
nested, the application of backward error recovery on a 
failed enclosing block is costly. Consider N nested blocks 
with Ni.alternates per block. The maximum number of trials 
for theN blocks is Nl * N2 * ... * Nn. The recovery 
block interface is pr9posed to reduce the number of trials 
in certain situations. 
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When a block Pl calls another block P2 there are two 
failure possibilities. The first is the failure of the 
caller (Pl) and success of the callee (P2). The success of 
P2 implies that the input data passed to P2 by Pl and the 
results computed by P2 are valid since P2 must pass its 
acceptance test before sending any output to Pl. The 
semantics of a recovery block requires the reexecution of P2 
when the next alternate of Pl is tried. If the result of 
P2's execution can be saved the repeated execution of P2 can 
be avoided thereby reducing the cost of error recovery. The 
second possibility is the failure of the callee (P2). The 
f~ilure of P2 implies the failure of Pl also. A recovery 
action must be taken to restore the state of the program on 
entering Pl. 
The recovery block interface is only useful for the 
first failure type (i.e., failure of an outer block). The 
recovery block interface is a program unit that contains 
·algorithms and communication variables common to alternates 
of a recovery block. Tpe algorithms are assertions on input 
and output variables. The communication variables are those 
variables which are passed as parameters to other recovery 
blocks. It also includes values returned from calls to 
other recovery blocks. The recovery block interface also 
takes over the responsibility of invoking the next 
alternate. The programs that use a recovery block call 
the interface which then calls an alternate. 
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When Pl (outer block) fails, its input (nonlocal 
variables) is restored to their initial state. The states 
of the communication variables are preserved for the next 
alternate of Pl to use where result of P2's execution is 
needed. To determine if the previous (failed) alternate 
executed the call statements to other blocks a progress 
variable is included as one of the communication variables. 
The progress variable should be updated by P2 after passing 
its acceptance test. By using the recovery block interface 
the number of trials where P2 succeeds is Nl + N2 instead of 
Nl * N2. Thus the recovery block interface can reduce the 
time for executing nested recovery blocks when the inner 
block succeeds and an enclosing alternate fails. 
Software Support for Recovery 
The recovery block scheme and its implementation with a 
recovery cache [32] provides fault tolerance against 
functional program units. In operating systems where 
nonfunctional modules are common, restoring the state of 
nonlocal objects alone may not result in a consistent system 
state. The internal state of a nonfunctional module must be 
restored when an operation fails due to a failure of an 
operation or a revocation of a successful· operation due to a 
failure of a higher level module in a nested call. Language 
exception handling mechanism cannot provide this type of 
recovery because the errors are not anticipated. 
To provide error recovery in nonfunctional modules, 
operations which change the internal state must provide a 
corresponding undo procedure to reverse the change. The 
undo procedure should be part of the specification of the 
normal operation. A possible syntax for such a language 
construct is 
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Procedure <namel> ( <parameters>) undo <name2>, where 
namel is the normal operation procedure and name2 is the 
undo procedure. The implementation should ensure the 
automatic invocation of name2 when namel fails or when its 
action is being revoked. Another useful language mechanism 
is a facility to declare recovery data and statements to 
save and restore such data. A proposed mechanism is the 
inclusion of a backup data type in a language. A 
declarative syntax for such a type is 
backup <var> { <id-list> }, where var is a variable of 
type backup and id-list is a nonempty list of variables to 
be saved. The operations to be permitted on a backup data 
type are save and restore. The syntax for save and restore 
statements are 
save <var> I save <var>.id 
restore <var> I restore <var>.id 
where var is a backup data type and id is an element of id-
list. When the save or restore statement does not specify 
any id-list element the entire backup variable is implied. 
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A possible implementation of the backup data type is to 
represent a backup variable as a structure (see Figure 6). 
The size field is the number of bytes required to store all 
variables in id-list. The length field gives the number of 
variables in id-list. The base field is the address of the 
area to save the variables in id-list. The triples field is 
an array whose dimension is the length of id-list. A triple 
is represented as (loc, disp, nbyte), where loc is the 
storage address of a variable in id-list, disp is the 
displacement of the variable from base (save area), and 
nbyte is the number of bytes occupied by the variable. 
I size I length I base I triples I 
Figure 6. Backup Data Type 
Representation 
The a9vantage of a language mechanism over the recovery 
cache [32] is that it can be used in a virtual memory 
envir~nment. The save address in the recovery cache scheme 
is real address while it is a virtual address in the 
software approach. The combination of undo procedures and 
backup variables can be used to restore the internal state 
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of a nonfunctional module. 
Architecture Assistance 
for Error Recovery 
Architecture assistance for software error recovery is 
required to speed up and to automate the recovery process so 
that it is transparent to users. The architecture should 
provide two types of assistance for effective recoyery. The 
first is for error recovery within a single process or 
procedure and the second is recovery for interacting 
processes. 
To provide error recovery within a single process or 
procedure, the processor should include instructions to 
perform save and restore operations and an instruction to 
discard a recovery data when the executing context 
terminates in its instruction set. A system data structure 
called a recovery context to facilitate automatic error 
recovery is shown in Figure 7. A recovery context should be 
created for each procedure. 
PBVD I CE I TF I AUPD I . NIT PTRC 
Figure 7. Recovery Context Data Structure 
67 
The recovery context data structure contains information 
to enable the architecture perform a recovery action ~hen an 
error is detected or to reclaim the storage used to store 
recovery information when it is no longer needed. The PBVD 
field is an address of a backup variable descriptor for any 
backup data defined in the procedure. The CE field is a flag 
to indicate if a process terminated with (without) error. 
The TF field is a flag that indicates if the procedure or 
process is the root of a recovery chain. If the flag is not 
set, then the procedure or process is called by some other 
program unit. The AUPD field is the address of an undo 
procedure descriptor if one is specified. The NIT field 
gives the number of different procedures called by a 
procedure. Lastly the PTRC field is an array of addresses 
to other recovery contexts. The size of the array is equal 
to NIT. For nested procedure calls the recovery contexts 
constitutes a chain of recovery contexts. These contexts 
indicate the environments to be affected by an error in one 
of the procedures/processes. 
The operating system should implement a recovery 
process to traverse the recovery contexts and perform the 
neces_sary error recovery actions. The recovery context 
chain defines a recovery space. This space is bounded if 
there are no implicit interactions with other environments. 
A bounded recovery space ensures that the system is restored 
to the state that existed before an erroneos state was 
entered. To come close to .a bounded environment ideal the 
operating system design and implementation must meet the 
following requirements: 
1. processes do not interact by means of global 
memory; 
' 2. called procedures do not access memory areas 
outside the passed parameters locations; and 
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3. system decomposition is hierachical. The first 
requirement prevents uncontrolled interaction which can 
result in a domino effect (unbounded recovery space). The 
use of abstract objects implemented as software managers can 
enforce this requirement. The second requirement ensures 
that a called procedure modifies a well defined part of a 
calling procedure's address space. This requirement 
guarantees that when a restore operation is executed the 
calling procedure's envi~onment is completely reestablished. 
The second requirement can be met by using address 
descriptors to pass parameters. The third requirement 
defines an_ interaction path that can be represented by a 
recovery context chain. A system that is deadlock free is 
also known to be free from the domino effect [40]. The 
satisfaction of requirements one and three help to reduce 
the probability of deadlock considerably. If a system is 




A general error detection and recovery approach has 
been presented in this chapter with emphasis on backward 
error recovery. A mechanism to detect control errors in a 
nonfunctional module based on decomposing the module into 
three types of submodules called manager, decision-maker, 
and operations is presented. The main advantage of this 
scheme is that the internal state of a nonfunctional module 
is partitioned into control state and data state which helps 
to localize error recovery. The use of a recovery block 
interface is proposed to reduce the cost of backward error 
recovery in nested procedure calls. Also, a linguistic 
mechanism for a programmer defined recovery is discussed. A 
recovery context which defines a recovery space for an 
exec~ting program is proposed as a means to automate system 
error recovery. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
The study has pr~sented methods to restrict the flow of 
information in a computer system and its impact on error 
recovery in an operating system. There are two dimensions 
of information flow control. The first concerns how to make 
the access environment of a program as small as possible 
while the second focuses on the control of interaction among 
competing and cooperating processes. 
On the restriction of access environment a p~ogram 
structure called a manager is proposed. This structure 
provides two levels of restriction. The first is hiding the 
representation of an abstract object from the users of the 
object which is the only form of restriction provided by 
monitors. The second level is the presentation of a partial 
view of an object representation to operations. This level 
limits the damage an operation can cause to the state of a 
shared data. The manager structure partitions the internal 
state data of an encapsulated object into control and shared 
data s~ates manipulated by specific program units. The 
benefit of a partitioned data state is that error 
categorization and recovery can be localized. 
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Further restriction of the access environment of a 
process can be achieved through the use of a descriptor to 
represent address variables. The. use of descriptors to 
represent address variables ensures that unrelated memory 
cells are not mutilated through addressing error. Its use 
in passing parameters confines a called procedure's actions 
to a well defined subset of a caller's address space. 
The orderly interaction of processes can be achieved 
through robust resource and process control strategies. The 
proposed manager structure is both a resource management and 
a synchronization module. Its structure separates the 
control algorithm from operations. Its implementation 
results in a self-checking software because a decision is 
verified with an assertion before it is carried out. The 
separation of control algorithm from operations reduces the 
sources of internal state error of resource and process 
controllers. A good resource control strategy should avoid 
implicit interaction by ensuring that resource units make 
the right transitions from one state to another under proper 
circumstances. 
The recovery from an error depends on knowing what is 
to be restored, the scope of an error, and the type of 
failure. The use of a language mechanism to specify 
recovery data and procedures can solve the problem of 
knowing what to restore. The recovery context chain is 
sufficient to determine error scope in a well structured 
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system without implicit interaction. The recovery block 
is the most general technique for software fault tolerance. 
It is adequate for providing fault tolerance in functional 
modules. Error recovery in functional modules can be 
achieved by saving the values of nonlocal variables on block 
entry and then restoring these saved values on failure of 
the module. The recovery block provides automatic 
reconfiguration of the modules since an equivalent program 
unit (alternate) is tried when a module fails. The 
specification of undo procedures to reverse actions of 
operations provides the means to apply backward error 
recovery technique in a nonfunctional module. The recovery 
block interface proposal can reduce the amount of backward 
error recovery in nested block calls when an outer block 
fails and the inner block succeeds. 
Architectural support is necessary to implement a 
general and automatic fault recovery in an operating system. 
The minimum assistance required is the inclusion of 
instructions to create recovery context and backup data 
descriptors, save and restore recoverable data. The 
operating system should provide an error recovery process to 
be invoked when an error condition is raised. 
Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Work 
Error recovery in operating systems can be confined to 
the immediate environment of a failed process by employing 
design and implementation techniques that restrict 
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information flow through the system. The manager 
construct combined with a descriptor-based parameter passing 
mechanism can control the flow of information and can avoid 
implicit interactions. However, for pervasive errors 
(errors whose damage extends beyond the failed environment), 
the operating system should employ some elaborate techniques 
such as system reinitialization and us~ of audits to examine 
the system data structures. With good system structure and 
explicit information sharing mechanism, the frequency of 
pervasive errors can be drastically reduced. The proposals 
made in this study involve some space and time overhead but 
their impact on performance is not known. An area for 
further study is an implementation of these proposals to 
ascertain their effectiveness •. 
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